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### Is Śāṅkarite Crypto Buddhist or crypto Sāṅkhya?

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#### Abstract:

*There has been propensity among various schools of Hindu philosophy of borrowing some of the pre existing dialectical techniques and most of the doctrines of earlier school, convey new meaning or sometime explain them away ingeniously. Because Buddhism comes first in order of existence, Śāṅkara who was proponent of Advaita Vedānta could not escape from some influence on his thought by Buddhist philosophy. Impressed by Buddhist dialectics and advayavāda he has tried to present his philosophy bring Upaniṣadic and Buddhist lore together. That's the reason Śāṅkara was sometime criticized as crypto Buddhist. Yet the notion of avidyā and its relationship to Brahma creates certainly a crucial philosophical issue within advaitic thought that seems to be the marked inclination towards the Sāṅkhya dualism and uproot his fundamental position. At one and the same time it is an attempt to antagonize the pluralism, materialism and dualism undertaking Sāṅkhya system as their main opponent. As first one is dualistic and second is monistic one, cannot be supported by Śruti. Objective of the present study is a systematic exploration of Śāṅkara's philosophy to find, in his philosophical background what opinions were prevalent and influenced him most in shaping his philosophy. How much Śāṅkara's philosophy has resonated with Buddhist teachings, how far Śāṅkaraites able to prove Sāṅkhya as their main antagonists or they imbibed their teaching tacitly.*

**Keywords:** Sāṅkhya Darśan, Crypto-Buddhist, Brahmakāranavāda, Advaitavāda, Dehātmavāda.

**Short account of Śāṅkara Vedānta:** Advaitavāda of Śāṅkara is found to be well established in the Upaniṣads as their central pedagogy. His primary commitment was to establish his philosophy of nonduality of Brahma as the subject matter of Upaniṣads. Śārīrakabhāṣya of Śāṅkara on the Brahma-sūtra, also known as the Śāṅkara-bhāṣya is considered to be the main pillar of Advaita Vedānta. It is an exposition of the doctrine of Brahman that refers to the idea of Brahma as only ultimate reality and transient phenomenal world is claimed to be superimposed on Brahma due to wrong identification of Self and not self or mind body of individual soul, caused by avidyā or wrong knowledge of nondiscrimination. Jīvātman is non different from Brahma, and spiritual liberation is

immediate epistemic recognition of one's consciousness as the numerically identical with nondual existence or Brahma.

**Is Śaṅkara Crypto Buddhist?:** It is true that because Buddhism was in the air itself, Buddhist teaching held complete sway over the mind of the intellectuals it was almost impossible to escape their influence. Śaṅkara was not immune to its influence in so far as their main tenet is concerned. Some scholars suggest that Buddhism and Advaitin represent different phases of development of the same nondualistic metaphysics from the Upaniṣadic period to the time of Śaṅkara<sup>1</sup>. According to Mudgal their views of ultimate reality are compatible because Brahma of Śaṅkara and Tattva of Nāgārjuna both are transcendental, indescribable, non dual, arrived at through a via negative. While Advaita Vedānta postulates a foundation Self, Mahāyāna Buddhism implicitly affirms the existence of a deep underlying reality behind all empirical manifestations in its conception of śūnyatā. His famous doctrine of adhyāropa and apavāda carry over from Nāgārjuna's theory of samropita and apavāda. Both tradition hold empirical world is transitory, an appearance, somropita, aropita or adhyasta on tattva of Nāgārjuna or Brahma of Śaṅkara due to vikalpa or avidyā of individual self. It is an assertion or predication about what it is not. It is an appearance but in reality nondifferent from tattva, citta or Brahma. When avidyā is dispelled what is discovered is nondual bliss or Brahma and according to them jīva as jīva has no substantial existence, it is dependent, relative, limitation put on the Absolute due to avidyā. Śaṅkara's vivartavāda seems to be presentation of ajātivāda in a more sophisticated manner, it is origination without actually being so and both of them hold bodhi or aporkṣajñāna is the cause of liberation and obliteration of all duality, state of ineffable, unutterable state.<sup>2</sup> Such similarity attracted some scholars seeing them coincide in their main tenet, expressing the same eternal absolute truth<sup>3</sup> to led them think that there is little difference between them and to declare Śaṅkara as crypto Buddhist. But if we try to think our way back into deep down of metaphysical sphere we can obtain more crystalline view that Buddhism from earliest days denied the existence of eternal self-evident soul in its core philosophical and ontological ground, where as Vedāntin stake everything on Ātmān or Brahma as underlying ground of all impermanent empirical reality. Dr. T.R.V. Murti rightly observes that both the Mādhyamika and Vedānta belong to two different tradition-the Ātmān tradition of the Upaniṣad and the anātmān tradition of the Buddhist. Vedāntin accept the reality of Brahman or Ātmān in conformity with the Upaniṣadic tradition whereas nairātmya standpoint of Buddhism is total opposition of ātmān in any form.<sup>4</sup> There is no empirical nor Absolute Reality. The central concern of Śaṅkara against Buddhist nihilism is, there must be something beyond cognition which he asserts the self-evident self or witness consciousness namely the cognizer where Buddhism denies the cognizer. Then who cognizes that everything is śūnya, as a result their doctrine faces a crisis. In either case we need ātmān principle to make sense of our cognition. Though Vasubandhu says, ultimate reality is vijñāptimātra or absolute consciousness which is the permanent background of all changing phenomena, yet it is not ultimate ground like Brahman, from which everything arises. They rightly admitted the illusoriness of the world but failed to notice that illusion, cannot be

understood unless there is a permanent real element as its adhiṣṭhāna. Śaṅkara seems to hold that jīvas are nothing but Brahman conditioned by limiting adjuncts or avidyā. Jīva ultimately unites with Brahman and attains liberation. Therefore mokṣa is not other than Brahman itself, in this system. Nāgārjuna describes nirvāna in the opening kārikā wholly in the negative terms. There is no reference of jīva ultimately attaining nirvāna. A close look at his philosophy help us to understand also that though Śaṅkara was very much influenced by Buddhist philosophy yet his vehement criticism of their concept of world shows that Śaṅkara's philosophy is very different from Buddhist one. All the more influence of Buddhism on him is aligned through his guru Gauḍapāda. Distinction of three level of reality, doctrine of māyā came to him by succession, from Nāgārjuna to Gauḍapāda and from Gauḍapāda to Śaṅkara which has no citation in the Upaniṣad.

All though it is well known, Śaṅkara is a staunch advocate of metaphysical idealism, his epistemology is proven to be largely realistic, which becomes very much evidence in his bhāṣya on sutra(II.2.28) where he said in his criticism of subjective idealism, external objects exist outside the mind of perceiver as it really perceived shows that the external world is real. In explaining the sutra (2.2.29) (vaidharmyācca na svapnādivat) of Brahmasūtra he endorsed the view also, the mundane level of reality cannot be likened to a dream. The apprehension of the external world in every act of perception cannot be denied. Here he is on the same platform with the realists and the pragmatists in admitting the existence of the external world outside and independent of the subject and judges the validity of knowledge by practical result. Though Śaṅkara maintained like Vasubandhu in particular pure consciousness is the only reality, permanent background of all phenomena and world is only the appearance still he emphasizes the phenomenal reality of the world to a greater extent and he wants to prove the unreality of the external world not by contending that it does not fall outside consciousness but by setting aside with the characterization, different from existent and nonexistent. Whereas vijñānavāda emphasizes the ultimate unreality of world, do not enjoy even the empirical reality. Moreover, Śaṅkara dismissed Śūnyavāda as nihilism as it does not accept a higher reality after rejecting the phenomenal world. He says in his commentary on Brahmasūtra(II.2.31) the dictum of voidness of everything is contradicted by all means of right knowledge (sarvāpremanāvipratīṣiddha). But the existence of this apparent world is generated by all means of knowledge (sarvābramānaprasiddha), cannot be denied unless some new truth is discovered.

**Influence of Sāṅkhya on Śaṅkara:** Consideration all aspects it would not be out of place to think that Śaṅkara's notion of Brahma or Supreme Self and his world view brings him closer than anyone else to the Sāṅkhya's Philosophy. There is tendency of Śaṅkara to take up or absorb Sāṅkhya Darśan more than that of Buddhists. Surprisingly the aim of his whole chapter on adhyāsa is to uphold dualism of subject and object which are opposed to each other as light and darkness (tamaḥ prakāśa bad viruddha)<sup>5</sup> which cannot be identified and as such he tries to interpret the relation between Brahman and the world with this analogy of subject and object and he has placed such a wide gulf between world and Brahma that they cannot be identified as Brahman is eternal, pure, intelligent and free where

world is changing, impure, unintelligent and bound.<sup>6</sup> Additionally he claimed in incontrovertible term that perfect wisdom consists in realizing the ultimate reality of two mutually exclusive order of being which are wrongly identified due to wrong knowledge nondiscrimination. The prominent contemporary thinker R.N.Phukan says, “there is no important difference between Sāṅkhya and Vedānta philosophy, what difference there is, is in the angle of vision. In Vedānta the world is seen from outside with a subtle philosophical mind, hence in order to understand the reasoning of Vedānta it requires a minimum intellectual capacity. In Sāṅkhya on the other hand, the world is seen broadly from the worldly point of view, it takes one gradually to matters more and more subtle and ultimately leads him to a stage from where he may easily realize all the fundamentals.”<sup>7</sup> On the empirical level Śāṅkara’s philosophy has a remarkable resemblance with the Sāṅkhya philosophy of the Kārikās with God added to it. An attempt has been made in this section to show their mutual relation and similarity amounting almost to identity. Śāṅkara’s doctrine of māyā which constitutes the very corner stone of his philosophy has close affinity with the Sāṅkhya’s concept of Prakṛiti. Śāṅkara’s māyā is unconscious as Prakṛiti and opposed to Brahman in the same way as Prakṛiti is different from Puruṣa. Although Īśvara Kriṣṇa has not described Prakṛiti as the upādhi of Puruṣa, yet Prakṛiti is said to be subordinate to Puruṣa in the sense that it cannot set into activity without being related to Puruṣa. If dependence of Prakṛiti on Puruṣa means its dependence for manifestation then both the māyā and Prakṛiti is dependent on consciousness entirely. Moreover Śāṅkara’s world view, his cosmology shows a clear impact of Sāṅkhya philosophy. Advaitic Māyā like Sāṅkhya’s Prakṛiti consisting of three guṇas, becomes the material principle out of which this universe followed as a parināma, by God’s behest. According to Sāṅkhya all effects are latent in the Prakṛiti, and simply come out of it at the time of evolution (ābirbhāva) and return to it at the time of dissolution (tirobhāva). Māyā is also un-manifest germinal power or causal potentiality, resides in Īśvara (parameshvarāśraya). Both the schools coincide on the point before creation there is an equal balance (sāmyāvasthā) of three guṇas viz. satta, rajas and tamas in Prakṛiti or Māyā. When this equilibrium is once destroyed by the presence of Puruṣa according to Sāṅkhya and by the will of God according to Śāṅkara, some guṇas overpower the other and start the process of evolution. Thus Advaitin seems to use Sāṅkhya’s explanation of satkāryavāda with a slight variation. In view of Sāṅkhya the world is potentiality pre-exist in Prakṛiti before creation. They are not different from Prakṛiti, as otherwise they would not be product of Prakṛiti nor they are Prakṛiti itself as they are its evolutes, but world as an effect is identical with cause or Prakṛiti in its essential nature<sup>8</sup>, here Śāṅkara seems to have found his vivartavāda. It is a change which does not introduce any change in the nature of the cause, is not different from nor same as the cause, ultimately lost in cause which remains unaffected and unchanged. Therefore it is true that parināmavāda obtains a place in Advaita Vedānta only with regard to phenomena having their cause in the un-manifested state of name and form. It is only through vivarta that the phenomena becomes understandable in view of their ultimate reason, the Brahman.

**Śaṅkara's antagonism with Sāṅkhya: A Critical analysis:** As it is mentioned at the very outset, it seems that Sāṅkhya is pradhānamalla of Vedānta. As tradition accepts first one is dualistic and second is monistic one, cannot be supported by Śruti as the main tendency of the Upaniṣad is radically opposed to its dualism of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti. Classical Sāṅkhya further maintains the plurality of Puruṣas and is silent on God but it does not establish the non-existence of God. It only shows that Puruṣa and Prakṛiti are sufficient to explain this universe. It seems Śaṅkara in order to establish his theory of causation of the world or Brahmankāranavāda in opposition to Prakṛtiparināmavāda attacked the strong opponent i.e. Sāṅkhya system at the very outset as per principle to defeat the prime wrestler in Tarkapāda of Brahmasūtrabhāṣya (pradhānamallanirbahānanyaya)<sup>9</sup> on rational ground. Notwithstanding that two realities Puruṣa and Prakṛiti together create the world yet Prakṛiti has got potency for which creation is possible on account of the fact that Puruṣa is indifferent, motionless and actionless, but intelligent and for the sake of enjoyment of the Puruṣa, Prakṛiti evolves herself in creation spontaneously according to Sāṅkhya. Śaṅkara goes one step higher and questions the existence of Prakṛiti. To him seer is real; there is no objective reality but only subjective reality. Prakṛiti is māyā. Main point of issue with regard to the independent status of Prakṛiti as an creative principle. His argument is that if Prakṛiti cannot evolve without being influenced by Puruṣa how can Prakṛiti be an absolute. If it is absolute then why should it care to serve the purpose of Puruṣa that makes it subservient to Puruṣa. A more difficult issue is if Puruṣa and Prakṛiti are independent, there being no third principle to connect them, relation between them cannot be conceivable. The Sāṅkhya's explanation of world of experience with the help of the cooperation of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti with the analogy of lame and blind man to fulfill their respective purposes cannot even convince Śaṅkara and he rejects the same on the ground as such, if Puruṣa partakes in activity assigning Prakṛiti to certain activities, it will presumed to be has lost his indifferent and inactive character. According to Śaṅkara the contention of mere proximity of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti cannot be also accounted for because Puruṣa is always there and it being the essential nature of Puruṣa to identify himself with his reflection in Prakṛiti he would never get liberation, consequently they should have to admit, the activity will continue for endless period of time.<sup>10</sup>

To Śaṅkara such problem does not arise if God is taken to be sole cause all knowing, all powerful who can produce appearances with the help of his magical power māyā according to the demand of situation.<sup>11</sup> Here we come across the dualism of pure Brahma and Īśvara or saḡuṇa brahma because the notion of perfect reality as fundamental assumption has been stretched by Śaṅkara in such extreme direction that he finds, the explanation of world cannot accounted for on this premise without assumption of an extraneous principle lest its purity is impaired. This principle is admitted by Advaita as māyā. He was also mindful of in particular material world cannot be proceed from Brahma alone nor from pradhāna or atoms, that are essentially unconscious in nature without being guided by an intelligent one can be the explanation of nature or the subjective aspect of the world and the universe of perfect order and harmony or brings forth itself the products

which serve the purposes of man. That is why he introduces this category of Īśvara as efficient and material cause of the universe and caused by inscrutable power māyā coeval with Brahma purportedly, that belongs to the vyāvahārika order of reality probably due to fear that if God be not material cause, he must be a conditioned, finite and imperfect being, limited by the external material out of which he has to mould the universe. Śāṅkara makes it clear with an example viz. just as in dream human mind creates its own universe, out of its own consciousness or knowledge in the form of memory and power of creating dream world without any external material, in the same way Whole universe including human being is created by Īśvara out of its own Jñānaśakti and kriyāśakti, subsequently all the creation dissolves when the seeker realizes the Self just like dream world fancied by mind dissolve when person gets up.<sup>12</sup> Metaphysically creation and destruction is manifestation and de-manifestation according to Śāṅkara. He elaborates his view such that, universe remains un-manifested within the Lord and he causes the manifestation of entire universe according to the past deeds of the living being or merit and demerits, which are caused by avidyā and accumulated from past life and which require to be atoned for, the liberated do not return since the condition of rebirth, viz. false knowledge is absent there in.<sup>13</sup> Therefore creation and destruction is beginningless unpacking of the original complex which contains within itself the whole range of diversity. Now question will arise whether he will not be defiled by this diversities? Śāṅkara meets this question with an analogy viz. as the magician is not affected by the māyā which he has himself created, since it is unreal so also the supreme is not affected by māyā or saṁsāra.<sup>14</sup> But such an analogy is not applicable here, because māyā constitute the being of Īśvara. Brahman becomes Īśvara in association with māyā but magicians' māyā is not constitute his being, it is his grotesque act done for fun or amusement. It is created by his will. Therefore implication that Īśvara should be vitiated by the diversity of saṁsāra. Because if difference in features and attribute of effect does not touch the cause any way then either the differentiating features should be regarded as existing separately side by side with the substance and externally related or they should be regarded as unreal appearance then the production of differentiating features would be inexplicable. In the absence of any relation between them the very idea of the effect would be inconceivable. Hence it comes to an end that the cause is neither wholly transformed into something different from itself nor can it be said that the substance of the cause admits of no change or modification at all in the production of effect. What is actually found, certain differences emerge out of the cause for the formation of the effect yet some identity also is preserved. Further, being caused by Īśvara and having substantial identity with it, reality of world cannot be disposed to ignore. In lieu if be alleged to have that effect is only an apparent manifestation, creation is not real, then there is no justification for acknowledging God as the creator. More vexed question is how the conjecture of merits and demerits of jīva which are unintelligent can move God to create in a particular way.<sup>15</sup> If it really does then jīva and its merit demerit is sufficient to create world there is no necessity of admitting God as an ad hoc principle. He however was not conscious of the contradiction that when he at places upholding the category of lower brahma compares Īśvara as magician, as the material and efficient cause and contending as well the unreality of Īśvara on the onset of

one's realization of oneness with Brahma in one breath, he affirms in the next breath Brahma through magical power creates world illusion but highest Self is not affected by the illusion. On this crux question will arise what is the ontological status of Īśvara, if world is illusory creation from respective of Īśvara then his concept of Brahma is redundant. On the contrary if Brahma is only reality then there is no necessity of admitting such a superfluous category to explain world of reflection. Over again if māyā is declared to be inseparable power of Īśvara thence what is the ontological status of māyā? Is it exists independently later on comes in contact with Brahma or if it is said to be always there as God's power then in either case it leads to dilemma for this would then be suicidal to the conception of Advaita and God will presumed to be imperfect containing seeds of illusion itself like empirical jīva.

later Advaitin diverged from Śāṅkara not subscribing to the view that Īśvara is sole cause of universe. Dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭivāda propounded by Prakāśananda titled by Vedāntasiddhāntamuktāvali, maintains that perceived phenomenal world is fabrication of the jīva's intellect just as dream cognition.<sup>16</sup> Jīva is nothing but reflection of consciousness on nescience thus itself efficient and material cause of the universe through its own nescience or personal avidyā or saṅskāra which is accumulated from beginningless time<sup>17</sup> and is different in each individual soul.<sup>18</sup> Their contention lead us to the conclusion a certain dissolution of the world will never happen because the fact of the matter is cessation of avidyā of all jīva is never possible simultaneously. Moreover if jīva is being conditioned by avidyā itself become the substratum of avidyā then fallacy of mutual dependence is to be envisaged, consequently it has to be admitted too after the cessation of body individual would attain release. If it be so no man would try to undergo spiritual training for the removal of pain and the preceptor from which they obtain Knowledge is fancied by them that is the implication.

In any event the presumption of beginningless world and transmigratory existence of jīva along with avidyā invoked by Advaitin could not set them aside from problem of mutual dependence and from embracing the dualism of Sāṅkhya consequently. Because however far back we may push this, the defect of reciprocal dependence is not removed<sup>19</sup> then jīva will be coexistent with Brahma in every stages of life as jīva is identical with Brahma. Moreover it is self-evident that word rebirth borne within itself such an implication that it must be preceded by an original birth but Brahman being only reality original birth is not possible which itself is ontologically dubious and if one cannot thus really be born how could one possible be reborn<sup>20</sup> and that will be the explicit rebuttal of rules of logic. Correspondingly their hypothesis creates many contradiction within the system of philosophy in repugnance with the verdict of Śruti which they taken to be as a basis of their philosophy and valid means of Knowledge. There are many Śruti passages referred to the origination of world and jīva. Which told that in the beginning there was Brahman alone, one without a second world is manifested later on.<sup>21</sup> All the more, as in evidence Śāṅkara cites the Upaniṣads as saying that creation is not simultaneous. Brahman while becoming many has not transformed entirely, after transforming into the bodies he entered

into the living being as *jīva*.<sup>22</sup> Differently it is contented, only one part of Brahman got transformed into the world and that remaining part became the *jīva*.<sup>23</sup> Therefore it can be claimed, world and *jīva* have a definite beginning. This one in question leads to another difficulties since this position implies the whole creation stands divided into two basic categories namely world and consciousness in the body, this categorization appears similar to the well known dualism of Kapila.

As per *Sṛṣṭidṛṣṭivāda* offshoot of Śāṅkara Vedānta direct material stuff of the world is *māyā* and Brahman is called *upādāna kāraṇa* being locus of *māyā*. As *māyā* is nonexistent apart from Brahma. In fact due to association of *māyā* Brahman becomes *vivarta kāraṇa* of in the process of creation.<sup>24</sup> Nevertheless the relation of *avidyā* or *māyā* to eternal Brahman is hardly intelligible, If *avidyā* is illusory and different from Brahman then what causes its manifestation. If a defect be admitted as the source of the manifestation then that defect would require another defect for its manifestation and so on ad infinitum. As the appearance of what is illusory is always due to some defect (*doṣa*). If it be held, Brahman itself causes the manifestation of *avidyā* then Brahman being eternal, the appearance of *avidyā* too would be eternal.<sup>25</sup> Again it may be argued, *avidyā* is beginningless so it is not caused by anything else but on that ground it cannot be said, it is not dependent on a defect, because nescience being illusory it must be depend on defect for its manifestation even though it is beginningless. If it is said this *avidyā* manifests itself without an object then it would become real like Brahman, can never be destroyed and this position of objectless, beginningless *avidyā* is like a series of the blind, leading to the fallacy of infinite regress and once negating all practices of the world. Moreover as Brahman is admitted to be eternally free from bondage, it is a self-contradiction to think of Brahman as the locus of *ajñāna*. It may be argued again there is no opposition involved in it since the presence of *avidyā* in Brahman and its removal takes place at different times. In that case the eternal freedom (*nitya muktatva*) of Brahman would stand contradicted. If it is retorted since the relation of nescience to Brahman is only illusory so eternal freedom is not contradicted, for then the temporal sequence of bondage and release would be hardly intelligible.<sup>26</sup> The climax of absurdity reached when after inventing the category of *māyā* finds difficulties in relating it to Brahma he said *māyā* is *anirvacanīya* and its relation to Brahma is unintelligible. He defines Brahman and world in such a manner that he cannot reach Brahman through the world nor can he came down from Brahman to the world, when he fails to explain the world of our experience he declared it unreal or great illusion and conviction that it can be sublated by the *Brahmanjñāna* of individual soul or *Jīva* which is indeed Brahman, as well as identified with the intellect, the *manas*, the vital force, with the eyes and ears<sup>27</sup> and Śāṅkara goes on to contend such connection of the soul with limiting adjunct has false ignorance as its root.<sup>28</sup> To prove the existence of Brahman by only realization of Brahman, Śāṅkara thus recognized the need for faculty of realization like intellect, *manas*, physical body etc. for the time being without which Brahman realization is not possible,<sup>29</sup> it is not possible for Brahman to have all these faculties by itself. Nor can Brahman reveal itself to itself. Therefore, the sublating knowledge in the form, “This is not



duality but only non-dual Brahman” is a determination made by the mind which is not Brahman. Therefore he admits a second entity and he says at the same this connection does not cease so long as the identity of the self with Brahman not realized by the man. He brings in Scripture to lift us above reasoning as vindication of nondual nature of Brahma upholding the scriptural saying, ‘knowing Brahma and becoming Brahma is the same’.<sup>30</sup> But objection that if this is the truth then it is not possible to detach oneself again from that unity in order to awaken someone about that unique experience of Brahma. If Śāṅkara’s interpretation is valid then scripture cannot be source of knowledge. We cannot say also author of Upaniṣad has the knowledge of Brahma. Another big issue that confront us is how can it be realized by human being if Brahma is inconceivable in thought, indescribable in language, if it is realized then it is conceivable. We will then left with no other conclusion except that Brahma is unknown and unknowable. As a matter of fact metaphysics must be given up as useless pursuit and waste of time.<sup>31</sup> It had resulted in a general sense of spiritualism among the aspirants, Absolutism and transcendentalism far beyond their apprehension and paved the way of agnosticism.

**Conclusion:** The through going discussion in the previous sections must leaves us with an impression that logic of advaita argument leads to a clear vindication of and impels it to embrace of Sāṅkhya’s dualism, but it clings to idealistic absolutism or monism and dualistic seed of in Śāṅkara’s philosophy thus exhibit a conspicuous inclination of agnosticism with flavor of Cārvāka that is, Cārvāka’s notion of ātmā or dehātmavāda had a profound impact on Śāṅkarites. When Śāṅkara goes on to contend on the point, matter cannot alone create the world and in order to establish consciousness as the ground of all activity, he says even though activity is found to exist in matter yet without association with consciousness matter cannot move or no action begins, unconscious object cannot generate movement alone. At the same time he proclaimed consciousness is seen belonging to the body i.e living body when body is conjoined with consciousness.<sup>32</sup> At another place when he faced with the question how can Brahma become matter? He tried to contempt it and adds, it is possible just as non intelligent hairs and nails proceed from intelligent being like man.<sup>33</sup> Such a conception supposed to allude to the conviction that Brahmakāranavāda has within it sufficient potential to be worked out into Cārvāka’s concept of corporal soul, what is commonly refer to as soul is essentially conscious body. Again they equated personal God who is the reflection of intelligence in the impressions of the intellects of all beings with the blissful self of the sleep state of jīva described<sup>34</sup> as ānandamaya koṣa, the same vijñānamaya self which functions in waking and dream-state is called ānandamaya in sleep and cannot not exists apart from annamaya, prānamaya. Therefore there seems to be a great deal of truth that like Cārvāka, they refer to the conscious body as the ātmā or consciousness, which is amalgamation of consciousness and body. And with the help of this ātmā they only try to guess what’s the nature of Brahma may be and narrowed down the sphere of metaphysics by despising matter as illusory and excluding it from his metaphysics.

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- 8) Sāṃkhyakārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. XV
- 9) Brahmasūtra Śaṅkara bhāṣya sūtra 2.1.12
- 10) ibid 2.2.10.
- 11) ibid 2.2.4 (vyātirekanavasthitescānapekṣatvāt)
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- 14) ibid (Yathā Svayaṃprasāritya māyāyā māyāvi...saṃsprīyata iti)
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- 16) Vedāntasiddhāntamuktavali E.J.Lazarus and Co, 1998, 14-15
- 17) see Bhāmati Jayakrishna Das Haridas Gupta, Benaras City, 1935 Chowkhamba Sanskrit series Office 11.4.3) (Na vyaṃ pradhāna vadavidyāṃ sarvajivesu akaṃcakṣmahe....Kimtviyam pratijivambhidyate)
- 18) ibid, P.230 (Na tatāttvikamaiśvaryaṃ sarvajñātvaṃ ca Brahmanah kintvavidyopadhikam)
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  - 25) Sri Vedāntadeśikā's Śataduṣānī, ed. Srivatsankachar, V.D Ramaswami, Madras, 1974 vāda.41 (Nityasarvagatasaksinsannidhāne jñātājñātavibhāga jñānavacehedeka nivartaka
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  - 27) Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad 4.4.5 and Śri Śāṅkaragrānthāvali Brahmansūtra Bhāṣya, op.cit, 2.3.17 p.449
  - 28) Śri Śāṅkaragrānthāvali Brahmansūtra Bhāṣya, op.cit, sūtra 2.3.30 p.463
  - 29) Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad 4.4.19, Kaṭha Upaniṣad 1.3.12
  - 30) Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad 3.2.9
  - 31) Mudgal S.G, op.cit p.25
  - 32) Brahmāsūtra Śāṅkara bhāṣya 2.2.2
  - 33) ibid.2.1.6
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