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### The Notion of Rigid Designator

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#### Abstract:

*Kripke holds that appropriate names not at all like unmistakable portrayals are 'rigid designators'. That means they have the same reference in all possible worlds. That implies they have similar reference in every single imaginable world. Likewise to Kripke, the capability of a legitimate name is basically to assign a particular person. It assigns an individual not in excellence of its being the person which has specific properties, yet just qua that particular person. Assuming the person that a legitimate name assigns had a few properties unique in relation to the properties it really has, the appropriate name would in any case assign that person. For Kripke, a legitimate name is an unbending designator as in its reference in all potential universes is resolved by means of its reference in the genuine world, or that it assigns similar person in every conceivable world. In the event that an articulation assigns different person in various potential universes, the articulation is non-rigid.*

In this paper I shall try to explain the notion of rigid designator in Kripke's philosophy.

**Keywords: Language, Designator, Modal, Epistemological and Semantic.**

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The way of thinking of language manages a few issues like issue of importance, uses of language, and reference assurance and expectation of legitimate names. This exposition manages the last issue. One of the main issues of reasoning of language is: what number of ways are there to fix the reference of appropriate names? Frege believed that a reference is fixed by a solitary term called legitimate name, by mean of an unmistakable portrayal exceptionally fulfills that appropriate name. Philosophical interest in language had been seen in twentieth hundred years, trailed by work done in the field in nineteenth 100 years, alongside the advancement of rationale in which savants made their significant commitment. In his work Begriffsschrift Frege presented evaluates variable documentation for consensus which is the groundwork of present arrangement of predicate rationale. He communicated combination, disjunction, or the existential quantifier through three coherent constants. He has images for these constants. It very well may be accomplished by the expansion of predicate, non-sensible constants and so on. Presently, it is feasible to approach sentences regarding any matter like number juggling, math, with the goal that insightful thinking might be completed on these sentences.

According to Kripke, proper names, in contrast to definite descriptions, are "rigid designators." That implies they have similar reference in every single imaginable world. In like manner to Kripke, the capability of a legitimate name is just to assign a particular person. It does not identify a person as the person who possesses particular characteristics; rather, it simply refers to that particular person. The proper name would still refer to the person even if they possessed some characteristics that were distinct from the characteristics it actually possesses. For Kripke, a legitimate name is an unbending designator as in its reference in all potential universes is resolved by means of its reference in the genuine world, or that it assigns similar person in every single imaginable world. An expression is non-rigid if it refers to different people in different possible worlds. Non-rigid designators are some of the definite descriptions because they do not have the same reference across all possible worlds. For instance, the clear depiction 'the educator of Alexander the extraordinary' is a non-unbending designator, for however it assigns Aristotle in the real world, it might assign a few others in other potential universes. The referent of the specific description "the teacher of Alexander the Great" in that hypothetical world would be someone other than Aristotle if one were to associate the property of being the teacher of Alexander the Great with someone other than Aristotle. The unequivocal depiction 'the square base of 25', then again, is an unbending designator, since it assigns similar number, to be specific the number 5, in generally potential universes.

Kripke debunks the Frege and Russell thesis that proper names are shortened or truncated descriptions in his seminal lectures *Naming and Necessity*. He gives a few counterexamples to discredit the hypothesis. Salmon asserts that Kripke's argument against descriptivism, also known as the pure aspect, is made up of three parts: modal, epistemological, and semantical.

Kripke's primary challenge when giving lectures is to refute Frege and Russell's thesis. I believe that the actual point of the refutation is to point out that proper name reference fixation cannot be resolved using description theories. According to Kripke, Russell's description of "the last great philosopher of antiquity was fond of dogs" can be used to analyze the statement "Aristotle was fond of dogs." Kripke maintains that the final philosopher of antiquity could have been someone other than Aristotle in a counterfactual circumstance. This sullied unmistakable depiction is by all accounts focal worry for Russell. Kripke tries to show that a specific description can't tell you where a proper name comes from. Kripke claims that proper names are not given meaning by the description theories because they serve only to identify and stipulate references. For instance, 'Aristotle' may not be subbed with the depiction 'the educator of Alexander the Incomparable' as there would have been some other individual who had shown Alexander the Incomparable in a few other counterfactual circumstances. The description theories only talk about a real name. A proper name has no meaning in the description; rather, it only serves as a reference for that name.

<sup>1</sup>The property of description known as Fregean sense makes it possible to identify the

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. Sikander, J., *A critical study of the theories of proper names with special reference to Saul Kripke* p.104  
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proper name's reference. Kripke attempts to introduce an elective model for reference recognizable proof and expectation. He imagines the thought of unbending nature; and keeps up with that a legitimate name act as an inflexible designator which inflexibly assigns similar referent in every conceivable world. As per him, the depiction hypotheses flop on fix the referent of a legitimate name in every single imaginable world. To begin with, it is helpful to break down the thought of inflexibly Salmon refers to a designator as "persistently rigid" if it does not designate any objects in other worlds where it does not exist. In his contentions against Frege and Russell, Kripke appears to talks such kind of unbending nature". In *Character and Need*, Kripke attests "... If the object does not exist, we should state that the designator does not have a referent and that the designated object does not exist. Ahmed's observation seems plausible. I feel that Kripke is intrigued to give a rule to designator to be existent on the whole or some or even none conceivable world.<sup>2</sup> Kripkean idea of unbending designator might be called what he depicts as emphatically inflexible. In every possible world where that thing actually exists, a proper name refers to the same thing. These are the situations in which an object's specific properties must be present. A designator must have a referent that exists in all possible worlds for it to be extremely rigid. On the off chance that it isn't the case; then, at that point, the designator isn't firmly unbending yet diligently inflexible. In *Character and Need*, Kripke declares that 'a,- name, say, "Nixon," would be called as "Nixon" regardless of whether there is no individual at any point existed in any conceivable world. Kripke argues that the name "Nixon" will always refer to Nixon as a person, which may come as a surprise. It goes without saying that in those worlds, it will be assumed that there is no real person. The person could be a character in a movie, story, or "work of fiction" according to Frege. The fact of the matter is that even in such cases the thought of unbending nature falls flat. I have held that there might be a few names which are without any genuine referent. By asserting that such proper names will continue to designate the same referent in all possible worlds, Kripke attempts to address the issue of "void proper names." For instance, the proper name "Unicorn" strictly refers to an animal of a particular kind that had never existed in some explained possible world even if someone says "Unicom" had never existed. In 2005, a "monkey man" who had spread violence throughout Delhi, India's capital, was discovered. Some people hold the misconception that "monkey man" never existed and that it was simply false information that had been disseminated by devious politicians in order to instill fear in society. It is also true that such a man has not yet been discovered. The question of whether "monkey man" actually existed seems to be a contentious one. However, Kripke would have insisted that despite the foregoing, the name still refers to a "monkey man" in some hypothetical world where he is referred to as Delhi. In the Kripkean system, he insists that even in counterfactual situations where the referent is absent, a proper name firmly designates its referent. That's what assuming we say "Sir Syed Alimad Khan" established "Aligarh Muslim University" what we mean by it? Was it essential that "Sir Syed Ahmad Khan" established the 'Aligarh Muslim College'? Maybe not. Some other individual would

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<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Sikander, J., A critical study of the theories of proper names with special reference to Saul Kripke p.105*  
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have established the college. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan would not have initiated the endeavor of establishing a university in order to foster the growth of a particular community. According to Kripke's perspective, "Sir Syed Ahmad Khan" or "Aligarh Muslim University" might not have been established at all in certain counterfactual scenarios.<sup>3</sup>

Kripke uses three arguments that Salmon describes as modal, epistemological, and semantical to disprove Frege-Russell's thesis. The modular contention is by all accounts fundamental to the invalidation of Frege-Russell regulation. It also appears to be the most talked-about one. Kripke uses the terms "real" and "possible" in this kind of argument. Kripke talks a similarity of two normal dice from school practices in likelihood. He asserts that "...in fact introduced to a set of (miniature) possible worlds at a tender age." The dice's thirty-six possible states are actually thirty-six different worlds. Presently, there is only one, what he calls smaller than usual world is really understood, contingent upon the substance of dice comes up like 2, 4 or 6. There shouldn't be any confusion about the issue, in my opinion. He adds that "possible worlds" are complete "ways the world might have been," states, or histories of the world as a whole. Kripke attempts to depict the image of the hypothesis of legitimate names in holding that we can specify a reference by giving a few novel properties to somebody so we can select that a specific person in some utilizing utilization of appropriate names. If "Stephan Hawking" is the individual who questioned Albert Einstein's theory of relativity, there may be a number of people who are unaware of this fact. However, these individuals effectively utilize the name notwithstanding being oblivious to his hypothesis. However, in such cases there is an infringement of what Kripke calls non circulatory condition'.<sup>4</sup>

This contention doesn't talk as far as need and plausibility as the modular contention does. Semantic argument can be used to analyze Kripke's descriptivism refutation. After that, the argument goes on to say that facts about a proper name's referent are not always true; rather, they are actually true if those facts are found empirically. Be that as it may, a similar would be contingent; on the off chance that descriptivism account is to be followed for example some specific appropriate name would mean same as its comparing distinct portrayal. A definite description that is empirically or what Hughes refers to as semantically equivalent to the referent can be used to analyze a proper name in the correct sense. I would like to consider Frege's examples of "Aphla" and "Ateb" once more in order to deal with this kind of argument (the example is a general outline of pure descriptivism). Now, "Aphla" means "the mountain 5000 meters high from the northern region," while "Ateb" means "the mountain 5000 meters high from the southern region." Both of these abbreviations are used interchangeably.<sup>5</sup> Additionally, it has been empirically demonstrated that the mountain is referred to by two names. This is polluted record of descriptivism. The

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<sup>3</sup> Cf. Sikander, J., *A critical study of the theories of proper names with special reference to Saul Kripke* pp-104-105

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Sikander, J., *A critical study of the theories of proper names with special reference to Saul Kripke* p.106

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Sikander, J., *A critical study of the theories of proper names with special reference to Saul Kripke* p.106

recommendation attributed to "Aphla" is same as the suggestion credited to "Ateb." That is the reason; it is against unadulterated record of descriptivism in light of the fact that for them "Aphla" should comprise of same remarkable properties (concerning quality). Pure descriptivism holds that "Aphla" and "Ateb" can only exist if they possess a set of distinct characteristics that make them stand out from other entities. Yet, here, both the names are sharing the majority of the properties. As a result, descriptivism as a whole fails. Yet at the same time sullied or blended perspective remaining parts in salvageable shape. They appear to use the same abbreviation, such as "the mountain 5000 meters high," but in different senses. Prior to observational examination, both "Aphla" and "Ateb" remembered to allude to various mountains. Epistemological contention: A portion of Kripke's contentions are of epistemological nature, managing realizing reality with respect to reference deduced. Kripke's use of 'Godel's model is truth be told two overlap for example for epistemological as well with respect to modular contentions. There is no need to misunderstand the former and the latter, in fact.

If we look at Kripke's argument from an epistemological perspective, we can say that "Godel" means "the man who proved incompleteness of arithmetic theorem." According to the conviction of description theory (pure), this tells us the truth about "Godel." In any case, Kripke demands that inspite of the way that 'Godel' demonstrated deficiency of number juggling hypothesis, reality may not be known deduced. He provides counterexamples, arguing that "Schmidt" discovered the same thing and that "Godel" was incorrectly credited with its discovery. Because it was discovered later, the truth is now known a posteriori. The counterexample actually serves two purposes: first, it challenges descriptivism, and second, it challenges Immanuel Kant's epistemology and his slogan, "synthetic judgment a priori." "Godel" is not the same as "the man who proved incompleteness of arithmetic theorem" in Kripke's example, which is a mixed description. Pure descriptivism, on the other hand, holds that there is a qualitative description comparable to a proper name like "Godel."<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Cf. Sikander, J., *A critical study of the theories of proper names with special reference to Saul Kripke* p.107  
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