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A Peer-=
Reviewed
International Jour=
nal of Humanities &
Social Science
I
Im<=
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Volume-=
IV, Issue-II,
October 2015, Page No. 20-28
Publishe=
d by Dept. of
Bengali, Karimganj College, Karimganj,
Assam, India<=
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Website: http://www.thecho.in
Indo-US Nuclear Relations:
Issu=
es,
Justifications and US Response
Ajay=
Kumar
The author is Ph. D Scholar, Department=
of
Strategic and Regional Studies, University of Jammu, Jammu J & K, India=
Abstract
This paper aims to throw light on the most contentious and
cooperative issues in the Indo-US nuclear relations and insists that Indo-US
nuclear relations mostly revolve around the three major shifts; Pokhran-I
(1974), Pokhran-II (1998) and
Civilian Nuclear deal (2005). =
Right
from the genesis of the Indo-US engagement in the international politics, t=
he
issues relating to nuclear aspects have been a great source of divergence a=
nd
convergence between the two. However, before the civilian nuclear deal of 2=
005,
India and the United States both had been taking a very strict policy stanc=
e as
regards signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (NPT) and Comprehensive Te=
st Ban
Treaty (CTBT). India refused to sign CTBT on grounds of uncalled for inequa=
lity
for non-nuclear club of countries. The paper concludes that during the Indi=
an
Nuclear tests the US criticized India but after signing the Indo-US Nuclear=
deal
in 2005 both the nations enjoyed their convergence relations.
K=
ey
Words: Nuclear, Pokhran, Foreign Policy, Armament and Disarmament, NPT, CTB=
T,
Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal. =
Introduction
Be nuclear is the prospect of every nation, even= those who are against armament. The use of nuclear material for peaceful purposes= on one hand and for war on the other hand are two most controversial and ambig= uous statements in modern times. At the bilateral level the states transfers nuc= lear material on the justification that it shall be used for peaceful purposes.<= o:p>
In spite of being
having the stable democratic regimes in the World, India and the United Sta=
tes
have long historical, diplomatic, strategic and cultural linkages. In
contemporary times, both the nations are treading in the path of mutual
cooperation and strategic relations. The United States vis-a-vis India seld=
om
realized latter’s significance in its quest for security until the
terrorist onslaught on the World Trade Centre on September 11, 2001. The po=
licy
makers of the United States remained mostly unshackled in the web of Ariadn=
e’s
thread of misguided understanding of their national security interests up to
the end of 2001 especially with regards to their perceptions about India. T=
hat
is why the United States foreign policy makers got knotted into several
international security and military missions where they had to lose several=
of
their citizens, precious human lives in the US involvements like Korean War,
Vietnam, Cuban crisis, Cold War, recurring contexts of West Asia and
Afghanistan etc. India is one such country which now appears to be an ideal
partner in the quest for global security not only for the United States and
European countries but also for the erstwhile super powers like USSR. India=
is
the balancing point in the strategic and security design of the world for
bringing about more permanent peace at least possible costs.
Indo-US relation=
s get
a setback in the wake of nuclear tests conducted by India at Pokhran in 199=
8.
It came as a big shock for the Clinton administration and was termed as a
lethal failure of the US Intelligence Agencies. US felt deceived at the
decision taken by India to go nuclear at the time when non- proliferation w=
as
high on its foreign policy agenda. The US official statements either delive=
red
unilaterally at home or in any multi- lateral forum were full of annotation=
s to
convey clearly to the parties concerned (India and Pakistan) as well as to =
the
world that this kind of action would never be tolerated.[1]
The strong react=
ion of
the US was given a practical shape and many economic sanctions were imposed=
on
both India and Pakistan under the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Act, 1994 (Gle=
nn
Amendment).=
[2]
India time and again officially declared that it has a long- cherished hist=
ory
of being a peace-loving country and she preferred to use her nuclear energy=
for
peaceful purposes and not for aggression. In a statement to the Indian
Parliament, Vajpayee, then the Prime Minister of India, made the following =
indirect
reference to China, noting: “We are not going to enter into an arms r=
ace
with any country. Ours will be a minimum credible deterrent, which will
safeguard India’s security.”[3] However,
the statement of George Fernandes that Chinese threat was the main reason
behind conducting the nuclear tests then Defense Minister of India, invoked
strong reactions from China. =
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sp; =
As that time, In=
dia
had developed two intermediate-range missiles- Agni and Prithvi. There were
apprehensions in the mind of the US that the display of the growing military
strength by India would result in the destabilizing the military balance in
South Asia, that’s why she pressurized India to abandon the further
development of its missile programme but India went ahead and test fired the
Agni, declaring it was only a technology demonstrator and that the system w=
as
not going to be deployed.[4]
However, India criticized the United States dual policy on proliferat=
ion
of missile technology because the US remained soft when China acquired the
missile technology and proliferate it to Pakistan, knowing it very well that
there was every possibility that Pakistan would proliferate that to the thi=
rd
countries and in spite of that unnecessarily delayed taking action against =
it
just because of the gigantic volume of investments it has made in China.
Instead of contesting China, the US conferred the status of most favored na=
tion
on it in the year 1994.
The double standard policy posture of =
the US
on the issue of proliferation of missile technology to the maiden states,
invited sharp reactions in India and the latter was convinced that the US
intentionally want to marginalize and contain her by denying her the due pl=
ace
and importance in the region as well as at the global level. In the words o=
f an
American author, H. R. Issacs: “If one could venture any kind of
generalization at all, it might be to say that both the Indians and America=
ns
tend to be in some measure apostles of righteousness, and when two apostles=
of
righteousness meet, it is not the beginning of a beautiful friendship.̶=
1;=
=
[5]
India’s Nuclear Test: Justifications and Washington Response<= o:p>
“It is only in the last year that there h= as been some course correction in Washington and New Delhi over the historic nuclear deal. If in 2005 it was the nuclear deal that opened the door to a strategic partnership, in 2015 it is the strategic partnership that has ena= bled a closure on the deal”[6]<= o:p>
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The
Indian nuclear test begins in 1974, but the test remained unsuccessful howe=
ver,
in 1998, India made her entry in the list of nuclear states by conducting f=
ive
tests in May 1998. To India’s justification, there were many rational=
es behind
the nuclear tests first; there was a quest for more respectable status for
India at the international level. The supporters argued that nuclear
weaponization programme of India is the outcome of the realities of the nuc=
lear
world and would serve its strategic and military purposes and would provide=
its
self-confidence, self-esteem and dignified position in the eyes of the world
and made its a dominant nuclear power to be reckoned with. Secondly, India has made a lot of
advancement in the scientific arena and the finances were also generated in
lieu of many investments from the other countries in the form of Foreign Di=
rect
Investment (FDI) as India walk downed the path of Liberalization Privatizat=
ion Globalization
(LPG) reforms few years before.
Thirdly, India&#=
8217;s
strategic environment grew both more complex and dangerous after 1990 becau=
se
of the renewal of the threat of war with Pakistan, Islamabad’s
nuclearization, strong evidences of Chinese support for Pakistan and the ri=
se
of serious domestic insurrections in Punjab, the north-east and Kashmir.=
=
[7]
Besides, the Ghauri missile test of Pakistan in April 1998 proved one=
of
the immediate stimuli for India to explode the nuclear device in May 1998. =
Fourthly, the Pakistan- China nexus=
which
was operating against India’s security concerns as the latter was see=
n as
the common enemy of both was also the major determinant behind India’s
decision to go nuclear. India wants to contain both China and Pakistan.
China’s advanced nuclear power status was a big threat to India’=
;s
security and not only this the former was proliferating nuclear and missile
technology along with latest weapons to Pakistan which was a direct threat =
to
India’s security. In spite of India’s reiterations, the big pow=
ers
of the world did not take serious concerns about India’s security thr=
eats.
In this entire adverse and hostile regional environment India could not aff=
ord
to remain vulnerable as far as its security and territorial integrity was
concerned.
After India choo=
ses
the nuclear path, the US tried all its diplomatic skills in persuading Paki=
stan
not to follow the same suit but the latter washed off all the aspirations of
the US by conducting nuclear tests within few days after India. Pakistan=
217;s
nuclear weapon program was Indo-centric. Pakistan has declared that it
cautiously delayed the decision to explode the nuclear devices for some day=
s as
it wanted to ascertain the reactions of the international community.
During the perio=
d from
1970s to 1998, Pakistan’s nuclear policy could be termed as a
‘policy of ambiguity’. The ‘not say yes- not no’ po=
licy
helped her to avoid the international pressure on nuclear non- proliferation
throughout all these years. However, with its overt declaration of being a
nuclear power in 1998, she came under the global non- proliferation agenda.=
Pakistan
and India were informed that sanctions would be eased in the event of their
commitment to sign the CTBT; participate meaningfully in forthcoming
discussions on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty; refrain from assembling a=
nd
deploying nuclear- capable delivery systems; impose restraints on the trans=
fer
of nuclear technology and supplies; and to enter into a dialogue for the
normalization of relations.[8] =
However, Pokhran=
II
was a blessing in disguise in the context of Indo-US relations because in t=
he
short run, Pokhran II invoked strong reactions and sanctions from US vis-a-=
vis
India but in the long run, US posture and philosophy about India has changed
dramatically as within one month aftermath the Pokhran II, US agreed to eng=
age
India for the first time in high level security dialogue popularly known as
Jaswant Singh – Strobe Talbot Dialogue which started on June 12, 1998.
Both Singh and Talbot cautiously guided their respective governments. During
the course of these talks India was successful in convincing the US that it=
was
the multiple-security threats from China and Pakistan which were the immedi=
ate
causes for declaring itself as overt nuclear power. Although the dialogue
continued behind closed doors, after a few rounds of talks, one can witness=
a
change in the US’ tone as far as the non- proliferation issue was
concerned which also helped both the countries to buy time to enable creati=
on
of a proper atmosphere to harmonize their positions.[9]
US approach on t=
his
whole sensitive issue remained guided by the concerns about regional stabil=
ity
and peaceful solution of divergence issues between India and Pakistan on the
path of CBMs. US has tacitly internalized the fact that the nuclear weapon
status of India, Pakistan and China is a harsh reality and could not be und=
one
so the best hope for it was to accelerate the efforts for arms-control and
crisis- management in the South Asian region. Another vital fact that has c=
ome
to light recently is that the US, which has been making the loudest noises
against proliferation of nuclear weapons, had stored nuclear weapons in twe=
nty seven
countries and territories around the globe with or without the knowledge of=
the
local governments.[10]
Nevertheless Was=
hington’s
positive attitude towards India during the Kargil Crisis in 1999 was the
biggest gain for India as far as its diplomacy was concerned. The US manage=
d to
signal its stand on the Kargil issue to India and proved it through action =
(intelligence
sharing) and this eventually paved the way for building a new level of poli=
tical
confidence between New Delhi and Washington.[11]
The US posture of pressurizing Pakistan to rollback its forces from Kargil =
was highly
appreciated by India but US refrained to declare Pakistan as a state sponso=
ring
terrorism also gave birth to simmering discontent in India.
The national int=
erest
of the US forced the Clinton Administration to improve the bilateral relati=
ons
with India, which led to his visit to India. This crucial visit was perceiv=
ed
by many analysts as a landmark event in the Indo-US relations which laid the
foundation stone for the transformation and paradigmatic shift in their
relationship. During his visit to India, Clinton announced the waiving of a=
ll
the sanctions imposed on India, in the wake of Pokhran II and also made its
stand clear that Kashmir issue should be bilaterally solved and it has no
intention to interfere further. This statement came as a big sign of relief=
for
India, which helped in narrowing down the ‘trust- deficit’ betw=
een
the two.
As during the Cl=
inton’s
era, main shove was on the promotion of democracy and nuclear non-
proliferation and it was expected that the main focus of the Bush
Administration would be on curbing and non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD), but 9/11 changed the whole scenario. US engaged Pakistan=
as
the frontline state in its Global War on Terrorism with gargantuan amount of
military and material support. Although India resented this move of the US =
as
Pakistan itself is a part of problem as she is sponsoring cross- border
terrorism for sabotaging India.
Many analysts in=
the
US believed that this combine goal created a critical situation for US poli=
cy-
makers in terms of striking a balance between its new- found strategic part=
ner
India and the indispensable partner Pakistan in the global campaign against=
terrorism.=
[12]
But, credit goes to Bush Administration for pragmatically handling these two
‘uneasy partners’ very cautiously with proficiency. In developi=
ng
agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of power in Asia, th=
e US
appears to have concluded that, measured by any indices India is undoubtedly
the pre-eminent and pivotal power in South Asia with a corresponding intere=
sts
in maintaining regional stability.[13]
And this recogni=
tion culminated
itself in the declaration of Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP)=
[14]
by US in 2004 which opened up many new avenues between India and the =
US.
Under the umbrella of NSSP, US announced to engage India in four vital area=
s of
dual use of technology, civilian nuclear deal, civilian space programme and
missile defense. The US ever close contacts with India are mostly determine=
d by
the consideration that it would also help its in getting closer to the regi=
ons
which are vital to its national interests like Central Asia, South-East Asia
and of course Indian Ocean.
US had been rema=
ined
the most staunch critic of the nuclear tests of India in 1998 but now the
former is not only engaging latter in the civilian nuclear deal but also
lobbied hard for providing exclusive concessions to India by convincing the
other members in the IAEA[15]
and Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG).[16]
The supporters in
India are satisfied by the fact that with nuclear deal of 2005, India has b=
een
able to get recognized as a nuclear weapon state by breaking the shackles o=
f decades
long ‘Nuclear Apartheid’. This deal is also significant by the =
fact
that besides providing the access to nuclear technology and know-how, this
would provide for significant long-term implications to India in accelerati=
ng
the economic growth rate. Critics, however of the view that this would
compromise India’s national interests and merely relegate India to the
subjugated position viz-a-viz the US. Opposition to the deal in India is
predicted on the anxiety that it is more than a mere civilian nuclear
cooperation and that this agreement is the beginning of the process of being
sucked into the American strategic game-plan for the 21st centur=
y,
with a distinctive ‘contain China’ element embedded within it.=
[17]
The Leftist part=
ies
staunchly criticized the provision of the Hyde Act=
[18] and
argued that India will lose all its sovereign rights to test in future. CPI=
(M)
argued that this deal will not liberate India from the ‘Nuclear Isola=
tion
Regime’ as promised by the government but made it a prisoner of the US
wicked strategic designs. How=
ever,
the BJP’s opposition appeared half- hearted; as it has always been mo=
re
enthusiastic than any other political party about closer ties with the Unit=
ed
States and therefore does not have any ideological opposition to it but in =
this
case perhaps it did not want the UPA government to claim full credit for en=
ding
country’s nuclear isolation.[19] On
its part, the UPA government reiterated on many occasions that the Hyde Act=
is
a US domestic legislation and only the latter is bound by its provisions an=
d as
far as India is concerned she is only bound by the bilateral pact i.e. 123
agreement and not by Hyde Act.
On the other han=
d, the
US is satisfied by the fact that as India has not signed either NPT or CTBT=
, so
at least through this deal, she could be placed under the International Ato=
mic
Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, as it would require opening up 14 out of i=
ts
22 nuclear reactors for inspection and monitoring by the IAEA. B=
esides,
with this treaty, the long cherished goal of the US to establish the nuclear
non- proliferation regime would be served. In addition, Indo-US cooperation
sends an indirect yet powerful message to threatening nations such as Iran =
that
responsible nuclear behavior will be rewarded, while reckless proliferation
will result in sanctions and isolation.[20]
On the other side, the staunch proponents of non- proliferation put
forward their concerns that; however, the United States is clearly bending =
the
rules to support India’s civilian nuclear programme, and is instead
communicating that breaking the rules leads to higher nuclear payoff than
obedience.[21]
During the
course of discussions in IAEA and NSG, many amendments were put forwarded b=
ut
the most controversial was a ‘testing clause’. According to this
amendment all cooperation will come to a close in event of any future test
conducted by India. India clearly asserted that she might roll back from the
deal if discriminatory and ‘killer’ amendments were insisted up=
on
it. During the whole course of discussions in NSG, the US strongly lobbied =
in
favor of India and tried every effort to convince the obstructionist countr=
ies
like Austria, New Zealand, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, Canada etc; to soft=
en
their stand and eventually succeeded in its task as objection from any sing=
le
member of NSG could create hurdle as the decisions in NSG is bound to be ta=
ken
by consensus.
But, meanwhile, =
a new
controversy arose; in his covering letter, while forwarding the documents
pertaining to the 123 agreement to the US congress for final ratification,
President Bush mentioned that nuclear deal imposed no legal obligation on t=
he
US to guarantee fuel supplies to India. As expected India staunc=
hly
reacted to this unilateral posture of the US and clearly remarked that India
will only sign the previous mutually agreed text of the pact and she will
definitely step down if the deal was fabricated. However, with the diplomat=
ic
skills of Bush, the issue was resolved and the deal could finally see the l=
ight
of the day and India was unshackled from the decade’s long nuclear
apartheid.
This deal proved=
to be
one of the transformational reference points in Indo-US relations as by this
India has been able to unshackle the chains of nuclear apartheid tied on it=
and
has been accepted with its unique status in the nuclear comity of nations.
India has been able to get recognized as a responsible nuclear power in spi=
te
of the fact that till now she is not a signatory of either NPT or CTBT by t=
he
sheer dint of it impeccable non- proliferation testimony.
Issues and Objections in Indo-US N=
uclear
Ties
The fact is crys=
tal
clear that both the partners are expecting a lot of tangible gains from each
other but there are also the second dimensions in their relationship as Ind=
o-US
nuclear relations are not totally immune from divergences as there are some=
irking
issues between them. First, there is the much debated issue of ‘Nucle=
ar
Liability Bill’. Under this bill India wants to negotiate the terms w=
ith
its nuclear suppliers that in case any accident or mis-happening occurs due=
to
defective quality of fuel supplied or technological faults, India could ask=
for
appropriate compensation from the concerned fuel- supplier country as to av=
oid
any more tragedy like that of Bhopal. The US is not very comfortable with t=
his
bill becoming law and on this issue the interests of both the partners are =
not
identical.
Secondly, the
lingering issue of NPT and CTBT is another point of deviation in their nucl=
ear
relations. The US wanted India to sign the NPT and CTBT but India denied to=
be
a part of any such treaty which is discriminated and unjust in nature and w=
hich
tantamount it to be in a position of subjugation under the nuclear five.
Although with the signing of nuclear deal between both the partners the iss=
ue
of NPT and CTBT has been relegated to the background but still this issue is
irking somewhere at the minds of both the partners.
Thirdly, the ind=
elible
impact of Pakistan as a factor on Indo-US relations is always a reality and=
its
impact on nuclear matter is also determining. Pakistan is not only a part of
the problem in the context of terrorism but also in the case of nuclear
proliferation. Pakistan had always been exposed before the whole world
regarding its patronizing of many militant outfits and it is under the close
scrutiny of the international community because of its active role in the
proliferation of nuclear technology to the “rogue states”.
Although there i=
s a convergence
of view between India and the US on the role of Pakistan in proliferating
nuclear technology and know- how to many countries like North Korea, Iran,
Libya etc and its possibility of being proliferated to the non- state actors
(various terrorist groups) but there is a wide gap between both the countri=
es on
the issue of approach to be applied to counter this menace. India wants the=
US
to strictly tackle the issue by taking stringent actions against Pakistan w=
hich
till now the US has failed to take. It will be attention-grabbing to see how
stringently the US would deal with Pakistan in this aspect for accomplishing
its long- cherished goals of ascertaining the nuclear non- proliferation
regime.
Fourthly, there =
is a
big divergence in their nuclear relations in the context of Iran’s
ambitious nuclear program. The US has been lobbying throughout the world to
convince the other countries about the unjustness of the aggressive nuclear
policy of Iran and to isolate the latter by all the possible channels inclu=
ding
economic embargos, stall in diplomatic exchanges etc. But India does not se=
em
to anticipate the views of the US on this issue because the latter is having
very cordial cultural, historic and diplomatic relations with Iran. To adopt
the segregation policy vis-a-vis Iran is detrimental to India’s
diplomatic and economic interests as India is importing 13-15 percent of its
domestic consumption of crude oil from Iran and the latter is also one of t=
he
biggest importers of rice and other commodities from India. The US is also
trying to press India for not advancing the India-Pakistan-Iran gas pipeline
deal further- an insistence which India again refused to admit as this US
demand is detrimental to India’s economic interests.
Objections
Indo-US nuclear deal is subject to various objections and criticisms.
Critics call the terms of the agreement overly beneficial for India and lac=
king
sufficient safeguards to prevent New Delhi from continuing to produce nucle=
ar
weapons. According to Henry Sokol=
ski, executive
director of the Non-proliferation Policy Education Center "We are goin=
g to
be sending, or allowing others to send, fresh fuel to India--including
yellowcake and lightly enriched uranium--that will free up
Indian domestic sources of fuel to be solely dedicated to making many more
bombs than they would otherwise have been able to make,"
According to a Congressional Research Service Report, "There are no measures in this global partne=
rship
to restrain India's nuclear weapons program."=
[23]
Some other objections include; firstly, it doesn't cover the fissile material produced by India
over the last several decades of nuclear activity. The CRS report says, &qu=
ot;A
significant question is how India, in the absence of full-scope safeguards,=
can
provide adequate confidence that U.S. peaceful nuclear technology will not =
be
diverted to nuclear weapons purposes."[24]
Secondly, this comes at a time when nearly all the major nuclear
powers--including the United States, France, Britain, and Russia--are movin=
g to
limit their production. Thirdly, these could include making India's existing
electricity grid more efficient, restructuring the country's coal industry,=
and
expanding the use of renewable energy sources.
<=
strong>Lastly, the agreement according to William C. Potter, director of the Center for Nonproliferation
Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies "appears to
have been formulated without a comprehensive high-level review of its poten=
tial
impact on nonproliferation, the significant engagement of many of the
government's most senior nonproliferation experts, or a clear plan for
achieving its implementation.”[25]
<=
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style=3D'font-size:4.0pt;color:#222222'>
Conclusion
It
is to be concluded that there are three reference points as far as
India’s nuclear policy is concerned. The first was the Nuclear Explos=
ion
of 1974, second was the Pokhran II in 1998 and the third one was the signin=
g of
Indo- US Civil Nuclear deal in 2005 which were the highlights of all the th=
ree
phases of cold war, post-cold war and post post-cold war respectively and a=
ll
these events played their significant role in guiding and reshaping the
bilateral relations between the two countries. Throughout the period of 199=
0s the
US pressed both India and Pakistan to sign NPT and later CTBT. Under its own
security compulsions India conducted nuclear test in 1998 and declared it a=
s a
nuclear weapon state. US diplomacy failed to persuade Pakistan not to follow
the suit and consequently imposed many stern sanctions on both the regional
nuclear rivals. After that to restrict the proliferation, maintain the
stability and to minimize the nuclear damage has become the prime concern o=
f the
US strategy in the South-Asian region.
In the aftermath of 9/=
11 the
prime focus of the US has been shifted to war against terrorism. However, t=
he
Indo-US nuclear relations were transformed when the US announced to engage
India in the nuclear domain for peaceful purposes under the Indo-US nuclear
deal. Through its diplomatic brilliance the US was able to get the clean wa=
iver
for India from IAEA and NSG and after being ratified from the Congress the =
deal
could at last become a reality.
In the end it ca= n be said that the US policy towards India has changed from “paying equal attention to India and Pakistan” in the early period of the post-cold= war to “focusing on India and reducing Pakistan” during the Clinton Administration. The focus was once again changed to “raising India and curbing Pakistan” when Bush took over and “regarding Pakistan w= hile respecting India” after the 9/11 attacks and the Operation Enduring F= reedom campaign in Afghanistan. After years long efforts, diplomatic exchanges and personal initiatives of the leadership and at this particular point of time, neither of the two partners would think of jeopardizing their newly found ‘strategic partnership’. Only time would tell what new twists a= nd turns would shape and condition the Indo-US relations in the near future. <= o:p>